Mỹ Tăng Cường Áp Lực Công Nghệ Lên Iran Sau Cảnh Báo Quân Sự

US Intensifies Technology Pressure on Iran Following Military Warnings

US Vice President JD Vance has reaffirmed that the White House is prepared to use military force against Iran if diplomacy fails, escalating tensions surrounding a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MOU) that has halted overt actions but left core disagreements unresolved.



In an interview with The Michael Knowles Show aired on June 30, Vance described the US approach to Iran as a clear choice: a long-term agreement based on permanent, verifiable nuclear inspections, or military action to protect what Washington perceives as its achievements. He stated that President Donald Trump wants diplomacy to continue but only if Tehran accepts enforceable limits on its nuclear program.



Vance characterized Iran's public messaging as contradictory, pointing to a gap between Tehran's denial of peace negotiations and acknowledgment of ongoing technical discussions.



"They'll say, 'No, no, no peace negotiations are happening, but there are technical discussions between the US and Iran about a peace agreement,'" Vance said. "That's a Persian negotiating tactic and a Persian double-talk that I don't understand."



In response to critics calling for a harder military line, Vance defended Trump's approach as more calculated coercion than unlimited escalation.



"The President is saying, 'I'm willing to bomb,' and he's made it clear that he's willing to bomb, but only when it serves a purpose," he said.



In a separate interview with Fox News, Vance stated that Washington is focusing less on rhetoric than on whether Tehran is willing to make "real concessions."



"We care less about what Iranians say. We care more about what they do," he said.



Context of Negotiations and Current Situation

These statements come amid uncertainty surrounding the next phase of negotiations. Iranian negotiators did not meet with US envoys in Doha on June 30 as scheduled, dimming hopes that the current ceasefire framework could quickly evolve into a broader agreement.



In Washington, analysts warn that the current agreement resembles less a peace deal and more a temporary cessation of hostilities. The tension between diplomacy and deterrence was central to a discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on June 30.



DateKey EventImpact
February 28, 2024Conflict begins16-20 regional facilities attacked
June 30, 2024Doha negotiation deadlineIranian negotiators failed to appear
60 daysMOU timeframeOption to extend or escalate

US Military Posture

Speaking at the CFR discussion, retired General Joseph L. Votel - former Commander of US Central Command (2016-2019) - stated that US forces remain capable of maintaining deterrence throughout the current 60-day negotiation period. This comes as Washington reassesses vulnerabilities exposed by the recent conflict.



Votel noted that Washington retains significant operational flexibility thanks to naval presence, particularly two carrier groups operating in the regional waters.



"Currently, we can maintain the military posture," Votel said, while warning that maintaining such a stance becomes more difficult "after a few months."



Although Votel noted that official details about damage to US security infrastructure have been kept classified by the military, he described damage to the US's regional facility network as "widespread" and "operationally significant."



Open-source reporting indicates that since the war began on February 28, 16 to 20 regional facilities have been attacked. These include major bases such as the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and the forward CENTCOM headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.



Votel noted that the conflict has clearly highlighted the vulnerability of fixed military infrastructure in the Gulf to sustained attacks, triggering a comprehensive review of Washington's regional facility strategy.



Potential adjustments that planners are considering include hardening central facilities, minimizing exposure in vulnerable areas like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, shifting resources west into the Levant, or transitioning to a more resilient distributed network model.



Gulf Nations' Perspectives

For Elisa Catalano Ewers, senior fellow for Middle East Studies at CFR, the larger challenge is fundamentally political. She noted that while Gulf nations bore the brunt of Iranian attacks during the six to seven weeks of hot conflict, the subsequent ceasefire has done little to address the "core issues" destabilizing the region, specifically Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, drone network, and proxy forces, which have been removed from the current MOU.



Ewers, who served on the National Security Council under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, observed that the MOU doesn't look like a strategic win for the Gulf. Rather than permanently weakening Iranian pressure, the current framework has left Tehran with new leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the ability to re-export oil through US sanctions exemptions.



Thus, Ewers described the MOU as "the worst option among bad options," leaving Gulf governments to defensively pursue both active de-escalation diplomacy with Tehran and attempts to strengthen security coordination with Washington.



She remains highly skeptical that the 60-day negotiating window will yield a comprehensive breakthrough.



"The ball has been kicked down the road," Ewers said, suggesting that extending the current temporary agreement remains the most likely outcome.



This assessment was strongly endorsed by Robert Mogielnicki, non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute and Middle East advisor at Teneo. He declared that his "base case" remains the continuation of the status quo - a temporary agreement, possibly extended multiple times - rather than a final, comprehensive deal.



Economic Impact: Oil and Shipping

The economic coercion behind diplomacy remains substantial. Vance has consistently tied negotiations to stabilizing global oil supplies, and restoring shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz has been central to that effort.



At the CFR discussion, Mogielnicki noted that maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has decreased to about one-third of pre-war levels. He warned that economic disruptions across the Gulf remain highly uneven.



CountryEconomic SituationRecovery Prospects
Saudi ArabiaRecord quarterly deficit of $34 billionStrong due to diversification
OmanReduced oil exportsGood due to alternative pipelines
UAEInfrastructure damageStrong due to diversification
QatarEnergy infrastructure damageWeak, lacking alternative routes
BahrainProximity to conflict zonesWeak, lacking alternative routes

Larger economies with diversified export routes and pipelines like Saudi Arabia, Oman, and UAE are in a better position to weather the difficulties. In contrast, countries like Qatar have suffered energy infrastructure damage, while Bahrain and Kuwait lack alternative export routes and remain highly vulnerable.



Mogielnicki also pointed out a cruel irony in the conflict's economic damage: economic diversification programs have not functioned as a safety net. Core non-oil sectors like tourism, aviation, and logistics hubs like Dubai's Jebel Ali port have been severely disrupted and more costly to operate due to proximity to the conflict zone.



Moreover, balancing budgets to fund diversification initiatives is becoming increasingly strained. Mogielnicki pointed out that Saudi Arabia's recent budget revealed a unprecedented quarterly deficit of $34 billion due to increased investment spending and recent oil revenue declines that have fallen from near triple-digit levels to around $70 per barrel.



Temporary Framework, Not Final Agreement

A broad consensus is emerging from Washington that the 60-day framework is unlikely to produce a final, comprehensive agreement. Instead, it is being used as a fragile mechanism to manage escalation while deeper structural disagreements remain unresolved.



The most likely outcome remains a series of extensions to the temporary agreement. However, CFR members emphasized that this creates a highly volatile landscape.



The return to overt military confrontation remains a live possibility, triggered either by diplomatic collapse, regional proxy miscalculations, or unilateral Israeli military actions.



Ultimately, Votel warned that without a broader strategic understanding, the regional security landscape will look exactly like it does today when the 60 days end.



For Washington, the challenge now is not just ending an active war, but preventing this diplomatic pause from becoming merely the prelude to the next conflict.



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